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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003133

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [MCAP](#) [MASS](#) [PK](#)
SUBJECT: CREATING A CERP-LIKE FUND FOR PAKISTAN

REF: A. PESHAWAR 463
[¶](#)B. ISLAMABAD 3035
[¶](#)C. ISLAMABAD 2962
[¶](#)D. ISLAMABAD 2961

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

[¶](#)11. (C) Summary. Pakistani military action in Bajaur and Swat is generating up to 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) who likely will need shelter and support through the winter unless they receive help in refurbishing homes and communities destroyed by ground and aerial attacks. In a nascent yet encouraging development, some local tribes are rising up to form lashkars (tribal militias) to fight militants themselves. We need to help the cash-strapped GOP apply classic counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine by following up military operations with humanitarian and economic development and rewarding tribes who fight militants.

[¶](#)12. (C) USAID is working throughout the tribal areas to provide jobs and small-scale community development projects, but they have restricted access to combat zones. As of now, we have neither the funding nor the program flexibility to help; we propose establishing a USD 2 million pilot program under DOD/CENTCOM theater auspices to provide condolence payments under rules similar to those that govern the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which has been so successful in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[¶](#)13. (C) Our goal is to enhance the writ of the Pakistani government, and USG civilian and military personnel have limited access to affected areas. We propose, therefore, to funnel condolence payments perhaps through the SOCCE Civil Military Support Element in Peshawar to pre-designated Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps officers for disbursement to war victims/communities. We fully acknowledge that this will be problematic, but we must help the Pakistanis hold and stabilize Swat and Bajaur. The September 20 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad was a stunning wake-up call--some are describing it as Pakistan's 9/11--and we need to move quickly to build on new GOP resolve to fight back. End Summary.

Renewed Military Action

[¶](#)14. (C) The Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps, finally, are re-engaged in military operations in Swat (Northwest Frontier Province - NWFP) and Bajaur (Federally Administered Tribal Areas - FATA). The GOP forces are meeting heavy resistance against militants armed with heavy weapons who are being

reinforced by brethren crossing over from Afghanistan and other parts of FATA. While we are seeing a new demonstration of GOP will to fight, the Army and Frontier Corps (FC) still lack capacity and an understanding of how to effectively apply COIN strategy. We are concerned that, even when the Army clears Swat and Bajaur, the GOP will not have the heavy forces to hold these areas while the Army moves on to neighboring Mohmand Agency. We need, therefore, to enhance law enforcement capabilities and help the GOP win a hearts and minds campaign.

¶5. (C) Ref B outlines the equipment/training required to turn Pakistan's outdated conventional forces into a light, mobile, COIN-capable force. To improve U.S. and Pakistani military coordination in the Pak-Afghan border region, we are creating a Joint Military Operations Coordination Center in Peshawar; we have completed one tripartite Border Coordination Center in Torkham and plan several more sites on both sides of the border. In October, we will initiate a train-the-trainer program for the FC in Abbottabad pending completion of a new training center at Warsak. SOCOM training for the Pakistani Special Forces (SSG) is ongoing. We are responding to new requests from the Pakistani Air Force for Close Air Support training.

¶6. (C) Key to our success will be changing the level and flexibility of how we fund COIN programs in Pakistan. In Ref B, Post strongly recommended that we begin funding COIN strategy in Pakistan as a DOD Program of Record, thus securing consistent out-year funding with which to craft our continued mil-mil engagement. This will synchronize funding

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streams and make funding sources transparent, reliable and predictable. Ongoing train and equip programs and a DOD Program of Record will deliver medium/long-term benefits, but we must also help Pakistan deliver short-term immediate relief in support of COIN operations.

New Condolence Payment Fund

¶7. (C) We need to help the Pakistani Army and FC deliver relief through some type of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is essential to win the hearts and minds of the people in the tribal areas. Pakistan must be able to quickly follow combat actions with humanitarian assistance. Additionally, they must be able to provide people who have been victimized by collateral damage with the means to rebuild. During his September 16 visit to Islamabad, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mullen discussed the idea of providing CERP-like assistance with Chief of Army Staff General Kayani.

¶8. (C) The most expedient method for assisting these people is to provide them a cash assistance package so that they can purchase foodstuffs and building materials to repair/rebuild their homes. Vouchers and the provision of building materials is not as effective since the insurgents are simply able to "out-bid" the government by providing cash handouts to ensure continued local support. The current economic crisis precludes the GOP from funding such critical COIN activities. However, as we know from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, immediate impact assistance initiated by commanders on the ground is extremely effective in turning the support of the local populace away from the insurgents and towards the legitimate government.

¶9. (C) Interior Minister Rehman Malik has appealed to the U.S. and the international donor community for help in assisting IDPs fleeing military action in Swat and Bajaur. Through USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, we are providing an initial USD 10 million in limited help (relocation kits, e.g.) to the victims of fighting in Bajaur and are applying a jobs creation contract to cover Bajaur victims. State's Bureau of Population, Refugees and

Migration is helping with a USD 5 million contribution to UNHCR. With USD 15 million in reprogrammed State/INL funding, we will enhance the ability of the NWFP police to maintain law and order by providing vehicles, communications equipment, bullet-proof vests and helmets. Using both DOD/MIST and State funding, we are enhancing our anti-extremist information campaign. State's limited resources, however, are inadequate for the job, especially as the military expands operations into other parts of the FATA.

How it Would Work

¶10. (C) We would like to build on the successful Afghan and Iraqi CERP and solatia (payments to civilians for property damage caused by military operations) models by providing condolence payments to give war victims cash to buy foodstuffs and/or repair homes/communities damaged in GOP-militant fighting. The difference in Pakistan is that our goal is to enhance the writ of the Pakistani government, so we would not want to disburse funds directly to the population ourselves. Further, with limited USG access to war-affected areas, we will have to funnel these funds through the Pakistani Army and FC. We have a potential model for this flow of support; the SOCCE Civil Military Support Element in Peshawar is preparing to disburse USD 40,000 in humanitarian assistance items to the FC for the local population.

¶11. (C) Ideally, the funds would be used for reconstruction of homes, schools, health clinics, government law and order facilities and key roads and water/sanitation facilities destroyed in the fighting. Individual heads of household and/or village chiefs would sign a simple receipt acknowledging they received funds and pledging to use them for a stated purpose that conforms with the program parameters. Funding could be used to pay for labor in support of community projects. Monies could not be used to

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purchase weapons or ammunition, directly support projects that benefit the Pakistani Army and/or FC, or fund for-profit government or private enterprises. Pre-designated Pakistani Army and FC commanders would be required to provide the receipts to the SOCCE Civil Military Support Element. Pakistan Military Commanders also will be responsible for monitoring the project to ensure completion. We fully acknowledged that this program will be problematic. We know that it will be very difficult to monitor the use of the funds, and some of the money will go astray. Given the opportunity to distribute these funds, however, we believe General Kayani will support a program that imposes reasonable fiscal controls on designated commanders.

¶12. (C) We are open to ideas about funding sources and specific monitoring/accounting mechanisms but strongly recommend that these remain flexible enough to deliver quick response COIN-based payments. We are requesting USD 2 million of DOD monies to create a new pilot condolence payment program in Pakistan. We need to be able to begin disbursing monies before the onset of winter in October/November.

PATTERSON